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INTRODUCTION

Let me begin this Essay first by making a provocative assertion.
Then, I will follow it by being a bit defensive.
This is my provocative assertion: When immigrant rights advocates
ask their local, state and university leaders to become "sanctuary
cities," "sanctuary states," "sanctuary campuses," and so on, they
carelessly hurt immigrants in places like Nevada, Texas, and Arizona.
And there are a lot of immigrants in those states. People who mean to
help immigrants are hurting them.
Here is the defensive part: When I say that advocates of "sanctuary"
are hurting immigrants, I am criticizing myself as much as anyone
else. In particular, I signed a letter to my own university asking that it
declare itself to be a "sanctuary campus."' Moreover, I am personally
likely to support most of the specific policies associated with

Copyright © 2018 Michael Kagan. Joyce Mack Professor of Law, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law. This article is based on the
author's remarks at the UC Davis Law Review's Volume 51 Symposium "Immigration
Law & Resistance: Ensuring a Nation of Immigrants."
1 See Carrie Kaufman, Will UNLV Become a Sanctuary Campus?, KNPR NEV.
1, 2016), https://knpr.org/knpr/2016-12/will-unlv-become-sanctuaryRADIO (Dec.
campus.
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immigrant sanctuary campaigns. My criticism is not about specific
policies. It is about the rhetoric and the labeling.
My central point is that calls for official "sanctuary" are rhetorical
malpractice by immigrant advocates. These calls mislead both
supporters and opponents, and ultimately reduce the political support
for pro-immigrant policies at the local and state level. On the one
hand, pro-sanctuary movements are rhetorically misleading because
the label fails to accurately describe the actual policies that are usually
included under the sanctuary umbrella. On the other hand, the
sanctuary label is counterproductive because it turns off potentially
persuadable voters, and makes a ripe target for demagoguery that is
hostile to immigrants' interests.
These issues are critically important now, as I write this Essay in
January 2018, because the Republican Party made fighting "sanctuary
cities" a central part of its anti-immigrant policies in the first year of
the Trump Administration. 2 In 2017, Republican candidates loosely
3
aligned with Trump echoed this line of attack in off-year elections.
Despite disappointing electoral results for Republicans, all signs
indicate that "sanctuary" policies will be a prominent issue in 2018
congressional elections. This is certainly the case in my home state of
Nevada, where leading Republican candidates for governor, lieutenant
governor, attorney general, and U.S. Senate made opposition to
"sanctuary" a central issue in their campaigns. 4 Nevada Republicans
have also used purported efforts to make Nevada a "sanctuary state" a
justification for seeking special recall elections against several
Democratic state senators. 5 I take it as a given that these are forms of
"dog-whistle politics," in which appeals to voters' racial anxieties are

2 See, e.g., Tal Kopan, Trump Administration Again Pressures Sanctuary Cities,
CNN (July 25, 2017, 8:38 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/25/politics/trumpadmin-sanctuary-cities/index.html.
3 See Laura Meckler, Debate over Sanctuary Cities Gets a Test Run in Virginia
Governor's Race, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/debate-over-sanctuary-cities-gets-a-test-run-in-virginia-governors-race1509274801; Sanctuary City Issue Propels Gillespie in Virginia Governor's Race, Offering
Window Into 2018, Fox NEWS (Oct. 30, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/
10/30/sanctuary-city-issue-propels-gillespie-in-virginia-governors-race-offeringwindow-into-2018.
4 See Megan Messerly, 'Sanctuary Cities' Shaping Up to be Focal Point of 2018 Campaign
Cycle, NEv. INDEP. (Aug. 20, 2017, 2:05 AM), https://thenevadaindependent.com/
article/sanctuary-cities-shaping-up-to-be-focal-point-of-2018-campaign-cycle.
5 See Sam Levine, Nevada GOP is Trying to Use Recalls to Overturn Last Year's
Election Results, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 31, 2017, 4:25 PM), https://www.
huffingtonpost.com/entry/nevada-gop-recall-elections us 59f8b778e4b046017faf3f25.
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coded within a less overtly offensive argument. 6 However, my central
point is that sanctuary campaigns have also been a form of coded
political rhetoric on the left, in that they tend to signify more than
they deliver, which facilitates mobilization and enthusiasm from
immigrant supporters. But this comes at a cost, precisely because it
makes the dog-whistle on the right much louder. In effect, the political
left validates the rhetoric of the political right.
In this Essay I will first set out assumptions I make about the
semantics and politics of "sanctuary" debates. These assumptions
include setting out the kind of actual policies that are usually under
consideration when people invoke the sanctuary label, and a way of
understanding voters who may be persuaded to oppose immigrants'
interests. With this as a background, I summarize what both
supporters and opponents seem to be talking about when they invoke
the sanctuary label - which in both cases is usually an exaggerated
conception of the actual policies that a local or state government may
adopt. I then explain why these exaggerated conceptions position proimmigrant policies as if they are in opposition to rule of law.
I.

SOME ASSUMPTIONS

My argument is built on a few assumptions that I should state
explicitly.
A.

One Label, Many Policies

When people talk about sanctuary policies, I assume that they are
talking broadly about one of three kinds of measures. 7 One form
consists of policies and practices designed to make state and local
services accessible to immigrants, for instance offering in-state tuition
for higher education. Another form consists of using local or state
resources to provide direct legal defense for immigrants who are
targeted for deportation. 8 The third consists of policies which aim to

See Christopher N. Lasch, Sanctuary Cities and Dog-Whistle Politics, 42 N.E. J.
(2016).
of "sanctuary" policies, see Christopher N. Lasch
et al., Understanding'Sanctuary Cities,' 58 B.C. L. REV. 1704, 1736-1751 (2018).
8 See, e.g., Dakota Smith, Los Angeles Creates $10M Legal Defense Fund for
Immigrants, GOVERNING (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/publicCasey Tolan, As
justice-safety/tns-los-angeles-immigrant-legal-defense-fund.html;
Trump Threatens Deportations, Bay Area Funding Immigrants' Legal Defense, MERCURY
NEWS (May 8, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/05/08/californiabay-area-immigrant-legal-defense-deportation/.
6

CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 159, 162
7 For a more detailed taxonomy
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preserve community trust in local police by keeping the police
separate from immigration authorities. 9 It is this last variety that has
attracted the most controversy precisely because it prevents federal
authorities from using local law enforcement to make their own search
for deportable non-citizens more efficient.
At the outset, it is important to note that "sanctuary cities" barely
has a legal definition, and to the degree there is any legal definition of
it, it bears little connection to the surrounding rhetoric. Until 2017,
the federal government had not issued any definition of a sanctuary
jurisdiction at all. In his first week in office, President Trump issued
an executive order alleging that "sanctuary jurisdictions across the
United States willfully violate Federal law in an attempt to shield
aliens from removal from the United States." 10 The order directed the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS") to withhold law enforcement grants from so-called
sanctuary jurisdictions. However, the only definition of "sanctuary
jurisdictions" provided was contained in a provision of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1373. This provision only
states that state and local governments "may not prohibit, or in any
way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or
receiving from.; the [DHS] information regarding the citizenship or
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual."'" This
provision stops far short of requiring active involvement with
immigration enforcement. It also does not require compliance with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") detainers. The
President alleged that refusal by some police departments to detain
people when requested to do so by DHS threatened public safety. 12 Yet
the minimal information-sharing requirements of section 1373 are the
only criteria that DOJ has attempted to impose, and even this modest
requirement has been tied up in litigation. 13 The salient point about
9 See generally Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies in CriminalJustice, 95
TEX. L. REV. 245, 281-85 (2016).
10 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017).
11 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2018).
12 See Exec. Order, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801 ("To better inform the public regarding
the public safety threats associated with sanctuary jurisdictions, the Secretary shall
utilize the Declined Detainer Outcome Report or its equivalent and, on a weekly
basis, make public a comprehensive list of criminal actions committed by aliens and
any jurisdiction that ignored or otherwise failed to honor any detainers with respect
to such aliens.").
13 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Announces
Immigration Compliance Requirements for Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance
Grant Programs (July 25, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-
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the Trump administration's approach to sanctuary issues is that there
has been a wide gap between grandiose rhetoric and the actual
policy. In his Essay for this Symposium, Hiroshi Motomura makes an
analogous observation that the arguments about sanctuary policies
that are most potent in legal settings are quite different from the
arguments that may be most important to generating public and
14
political support.
Comprehending the desire by many local law enforcement agencies
to separate themselves from federal immigration enforcement requires
a nuanced understanding of federalism with respect to immigration
policy. There is little controversy that setting national immigration
policy is an exclusively federal role. 15 Certainly, the federal
government may not commandeer local resources to carry out federal
policy, and to a significant extent, all so-called sanctuary policies do is
16
state that local police resources will remain under local control.
There are cogent arguments that crime-focused immigration
enforcement will only work if federal priorities are in sync with local
priorities. 17 Chief among these is concern that immigrant populations
are prone to being fearful of all police because of their fear of
deportation. When a local population is afraid to call 911 - or afraid
that immigration enforcement encourages racial profiling by police it makes sense for local police to visibly separate themselves from
immigration enforcement.' 8
Disentangling local policing from immigration can be accomplished
by erecting a rigid bar against cooperation with federal immigration
authorities, but such a policy can also be implemented so as to give
police more finely calibrated tools and thus more options for dealing
with relatively minor situations that they face in the communities that
they protect. Police officers face constant dilemmas about whether to
arrest suspects in borderline cases. This decision is made easier for
police if they can arrest a suspect on probable cause, but retain the
discretion to later take a more lenient approach. This might happen if
an officer takes a suspect back to the station, but then she, her
commander, or a prosecutor decides not to pursue charges. The

sessions-announces-immigration-compliance-requirements-edward-byrne-memorial.
14

Hiroshi Motomura, Arguing About Sanctuary, 52 UC DAVIS L. REV. 435, 460

(2018).
15 See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387,394 (2012).
16 See Lasch et al., supra note 7, at 1744.
17 See Daniel I. Morales, Transforming Crime-Based Deportation, 92 N.Y.U. L.
698, 761-65 (2017).
15 See Lasch et al., supra note 7, at 1748-52.

REV.
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advantages of having such options are obvious. They give police more
tools to resolve dangerous situations without disproportionate
consequences, and to calibrate their responses to the complexity of the
situations they confront after having more time to assess the facts.
The discretion that police and prosecutors normally enjoy is
complicated by the fact that arrests often have serious collateral
consequences, even in the absence of a criminal conviction. 19 If a
minor arrest can set into motion a major consequence like
deportation, police lose some of their ability to calibrate their policing
strategies to the situations they see on the frontlines. They also lose
the advantage of taking time to make higher stakes decisions, if the
most important choice is the first one - to arrest, or not to arrest.
This can impair their ability to deal with lower level crimes, in
particular.
This is complicated terrain for local police to navigate, and there are
many ways that they try to do so. At the extremes, a local police
department might decide to cooperate with ICE never or always - the
purest "sanctuary" or "anti-sanctuary" approaches. But there is
considerable room in the middle. A local police department could
decide to cooperate with ICE sometimes, when it makes sense in an
individual case. We might call this a local control approach, because it
would emphasize keeping as much discretion as possible in the hands
of local police rather than ICE, without ruling out some level of
cooperation. But, nothing in the typical rhetoric for or against
"sanctuary" addresses this possibility. 20
Given the wide variety of policies that are categorized under the
rhetorical label of sanctuary, there are many different arguments for
them. But since immigration enforcement is in the main a federal
function, any arguments for local policies should be focused on things
over which local and state governments actually have control. Many
advocates of sanctuary policies know this, and push tailored
arguments accordingly. Most policies are aimed at distancing states
and localities from federal authorities, but do nothing to actually
protect someone targeted by ICE. They could be described at most as
policies of non-cooperation, and many mayors and more sophisticated
advocates talk about them in these terms. 21
19 See Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 810-15 (2015).
Cf. Motomura, supra note 14, at 18 (observing that sanctuary policies can be a
way for localities to inject more prosecutorial discretion into federal immigration
enforcement).
21 See, e.g., Laura Italiano, New York to Remain a 'Sanctuary City'for Immigrants: de
Blasio, N.Y. POST (Nov. 19, 2016, 6:01 AM), http://nypost.con/2016/11/19/new-york20
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But, as Jason Cade has observed, advocates of sanctuary policies
often portray sanctuary policies as direct ways to challenge federal
policies that they deeply oppose. 22 For example, petitions have asked
universities and campuses to find ways to "protect" students from
deportation. 23 Advocates have called for municipal sanctuary
declarations as an "act of resistance." 24 Typically, when one finds such
rhetoric from proponents, it is noticeably vague. It is not typically
made clear how a local policy would actually resist ICE, or actively
protect anyone from Donald Trump, except through litigation or
providing an attorney. To a great extent, that is because these
measures are designed to send a message of defiance and dissent,
which is entirely consistent with non-cooperation, but not closely
tailored to what the policies can realistically accomplish. For example,
the advocacy organization United We Dream described a proimmigrant demonstration in May 2017 by saying that marchers "made
their voices heard ...to oppose Trump's mass deportation agenda and
fight for sanctuary for all." 25 Such rhetoric is hardly noteworthy in the
activist context. But it can be misleading when it becomes connected
with official policies implemented by municipal governments.
This gap between actual policies and rhetoric has clear origins in
linguistics and history. Sanctuary as we think of it now in immigration
politics was a movement of civil disobedience in the 1980s in which
26
religious institutions sheltered Central American refugees. There was

to-remain-a-sanctuary-city-for-immigrants-de-blasio/; Jason Williams & Dan Horn,
Cincinnati Now a 'Sanctuary City.' What's That Mean?, CINCINNATI.cOM (Jan. 30, 2017,
1:59 PM), http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/politics/2017/01/30/cranley-announcecincinnati-sanctuary-city/97240174/.
22 Jason A. Cade, Immigration Equity's Last Stand: Sanctuaries and Legitimacy in an
Era of Mass Immigration Enforcement, 113 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3053609.
23 Elizabeth Redden, Can a Campus Be a Sanctuary?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 15,
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/11/15/growing-movement-calls2016),
universities-limit-their-cooperation-federal-immigration.
24 Aaron Yarmuth, Make Louisville a Sanctuary City Now!, LEO WKLY. (Jan. 31,
2017), https://www.leoweekly.com/2017/01/make-louisville-sanctuary-city-now/.
25 Press Release, United We Dream, On May Day, People of Conscience Rose Up
to Oppose Trump's Deportation Agenda and Fight for #SanctuaryForAll (May 2,
https://unitedwedream.org/press-releases/on-may-day-people-of-conscience2017),
rose-up-to-oppose-trumps-deportation-agenda-and-fight-for-sanctuaryforall/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170904041808/https://unitedwedream.org/pressreleases/on-may-day-people-of-conscience-rose-up-to-oppose-trumps-deportationagenda-and- fight-for-sanctuaryforall!].
26 See generally Sophie H. Pirie, The Origins of a Political Trial: The Sanctuary
Movement and PoliticalJustice, 2 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 381 (1990).
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no legal or official component: activists simply organized safe houses
and dared federal agents to storm a church in order to arrest and
deport a family who had fled for their lives. 27 We can also look to
more ancient legal origins. Biblical law permitted temporary sanctuary
from private acts of vengeance after a possible accidental homicide, in
order to allow investigation of the facts. 28 In Ancient Greece, temples
offered sanctuary to criminals, even those guilty of serious crimes, a
practice continued by the early Christian Church. 29 The closest legal
parallel we have to that today might be diplomatic institutions:
religious institutions no longer have this formal authority. 30 But there
is a symbolic connection in terms of their moral authority to demand
mercy and protection for those targeted by the State.
Cities and states cannot engage in civil disobedience, and they
cannot shelter anyone from the reach of federal law enforcement.
Nevertheless, the older civil disobedience conception of sanctuary
gradually slipped into being a loose rhetorical descriptor for official
municipal policies. 31 This slippage set the stage for the gaps between
policy and rhetoric that we see today. Originally, sanctuary was an act
of defiance against law enforcement. 32 It is a logical tool for political
movements that believe the legal system is systemically unjust. In this
way, it is an obvious reference point for activists today who see
American immigration law as cruel, discriminatory, and arbitrary. But
because it is a tool of defiance, sanctuary rhetoric lends itself to
grandiose claims of resistance, rather than a granular discussion of
community policing policies.
B.

Types of Opposition

Another group of assumptions that I am making concerns public
opinion. My intuition is that American voters who express surfaceSee id. at 382-83 (describing the early activities of the Sanctuary Movement).
See Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321,
323-24 (2003).
29 Id. at 324.
30 See Daniel Engber, Can Criminals Hide in a Church?, SLATE (Aug. 16, 2006, 6:15
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andLpolitics/explainer/2006/08/cancriminals_
hide in church.htnl.
31 See Abou
Farman, In Defense of Sanctuary, BAFFLER (Apr. 6, 2017),
https://thebaffler.comAatest/in-defense-of-sanctuary-farman
("The terms of the
original movement - started in the eighties to shelter Latin American refugees, and
broken up by the FBI - were redefined in 2007.... Cities and counties did not
invent sanctuary, they adopted it.").
32 See Engber, supra note 30.
27

28
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level opinions that are hostile to immigrants are, broadly speaking,
motivated by two or three distinct impulses. One is a resistance to
demographic diversity and change, and a correspondent animosity
toward foreigners, especially those who are non-white and nonEnglish speaking. However, it seems to me that this broad group
might be further divided. There are probably some voters who
perceive the United States as a primarily white nation, feel that this
identity is under threat because of demographic changes, and will thus
oppose any non-white immigration. A recent tweet from Iowa
Representative Steve King might be a reasonably succinct articulation
of this ideology. Quoting in part from Hungarian Prime Minister
Victor Orban, Representative King wrote: "Diversity is not our
strength .... 'Mixing cultures will not lead to a higher quality of life
but a lower one."' 33 Not long ago, we might have loosely called this
xenophobia, but since the political rise of Donald Trump we might
now call proponents of this view white nationalists.
The white nationalist voter might be usefully distinguished from
others who do not always oppose immigrants or demographic change,
but who may become resistant if they sense that the change is too
rapid, unregulated, or out of control. This type of voter has been
recently highlighted by New York Times columnist Thomas B. Edsall,
among others. 34 Relying on commentary by political scientists,
pollsters and political professionals, along with demographic data,
Edsall wrote, "communities that are close to 100 percent white will
react intensely to a modest increase in foreign-born residents, while
highly diverse communities will shrug it off." 35 The basic thesis here is
that many Americans do not inherently resist high levels of
immigration or high levels of racial and ethnic diversity. However,
many Americans will intensely resist rapid demographic changes in
their communities. It is the rate of change, not the actual size of the
immigrant population, that matters for these voters. This effect seems
to be especially acute when it introduces a new ethnic group (e.g.,
Latino immigrants) to a community where they previously were
unknown. 36 We might loosely call these demographic control voters,
in that it is not impossible to imagine them accepting immigration to
33 Steve
King (@SteveKingIA),
TwITTER
(Dec. 8, 2017, 5:00 AM),
https://twitter.com/SteveKingIA/status/939117527375990790.
34 See Thomas B. Edsall, How Immigration Foiled Hillary, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/opinion/clinton-trump-immigration. html.
35 Id.
36 See Benjamin J. Newman, Acculturating Contexts and Anglo Opposition to
Immigration in the United States, 57 AM.J. POL. ScI. 1, 1 (2012).
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some extent, but they are only likely to do so if the immigration
appears to be controlled and relatively slow.
The third impulse that might lead to anti-immigrant sentiment is
belief in rule of law. This type of voter would have no particular
resistance to demographic diversity and could theoretically support
high levels of immigration, but would have strong objections to illegal
immigration. A person motivated by concern for rule of law will be
deeply uncomfortable and at least initially hostile to the fact that
millions of immigrants are in the United States unlawfully, even if he
or she is not viscerally bothered by racial, ethnic or linguistic
diversity. President George W. Bush offered a well-known articulation
of this orientation in 2006 in an Oval Office speech advocating
comprehensive immigration reform:
We're a nation of laws, and we must enforce our laws. We're
also a nation of immigrants, and we must uphold that
tradition, which has strengthened our country in so many
ways. These are not contradictory goals. America can be a
lawful society and a welcoming society at the same time. We
will fix the problems created by illegal immigration, and we
will deliver a system that is secure, orderly, and fair. 37
This inclination could clearly overlap with many demographic control
voters because it relates to a desire for orderliness and regulation. But
it grows from a different seed, in that a rule of law voter might be
entirely comfortable with a rapidly changing, dynamic society. But she
is likely to insist that all immigration be lawful, and will be troubled if
it seems (accurately or not) that immigration is "out of control." Such
voters are potentially vulnerable to misunderstandings about why
some immigrants are undocumented while others are able to come
legally. Such a voter could favor stricter enforcement of immigration
laws, even as she may be open to relaxing restrictive law. While she is
hostile to the concept of "immigration outside the law," to borrow
Professor Hiroshi Motomura's phrase, she is not inherently hostile to
immigrants.3 8
The white nationalist, demographic control, and the rule of law
impulses can coexist to varying degrees in an individual, and one can
be a mask for the other. It is extremely easy for a person who is
actually resistant to any non-white immigration to claim that his

37 President George W. Bush, Bush's Speech on Immigration (May 15, 2016),
https:lwww.nytimes.com/2006/05/15/washington/15text-bush.html.
38 See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 4 (2014).
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opposition is really only to illegal immigration. It is not easy to
objectively prove when this is happening. But for present purposes, all
that is important is the theoretical understanding that different voters
are likely to be motivated more by one impulse than another,
regardless of what they say. I should note also that this theory of the
American electorate vis-a-vis immigration is hardly unique. Most
efforts at comprehensive immigration reform in recent decades have
been based around similar theories, and aimed to persuade rule of law
voters to back immigration reform. When voters are motivated
primarily by white nationalism, they are probably un-persuadable by
anyone hoping to build support for a more open, diverse, and
welcoming country.
By contrast, a voter concerned primarily about rule of law is
persuadable. In fact, as a lawyer and law professor, I am generally glad
that many Americans are committed to rule of law, even if many are
confused or misinformed about the deficiencies and cruelty of our
immigration laws. Likewise, a demographic control voter might be
persuadable, if they can be reassured that immigration is not occurring
in a chaotic manner.
When I criticize the use of the sanctuary label, I am not concerned
with white nationalists, since my assumption is that they are a lost
cause from an electoral standpoint. I simply hope that, on their own,
they remain a minority. My concern is with the rule of law voters and
the demographic control voters. My argument is that many of the
actual policies pursued under the banner of sanctuary could win
support of these voters, or at least some of them, because they are
actually aimed at strengthening law enforcement, reinforcing local
control, and managing the changes that immigration brings to
communities. But the sanctuary label turns them away, for reasons I
will expand on below. The sanctuary label thus hurts immigrants by
giving white nationalists allies who could have been induced to
support pro-immigration policies. There only need to be a few of these
voters to make a pivotal difference in how a close statewide election
turns out, when elections are decided at the margins.
To be clear, I assume that people who readily identify as proimmigrant are not homogeneous, either. In particular, I suspect that
any poll of such voters would find a wide variety of answers to two
key questions. First, to what extent should the United States regulate
entry at all (i.e., should anyone be inadmissible)? Second, among
immigrants already here, who (if anyone) should be deported? This
second question is extremely important to so-called "sanctuary"
policies, as I will explain shortly.
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WHAT OPPONENTS MEAN BY SANCTUARY

Opposing sanctuary cities has become a central issue for many
Republican candidates heading into the 2018 midterm elections. In
Nevada, which voted narrowly for Hillary Clinton in 2016, Republican
state senate minority leader Michael Roberson has made it his central
issue. 39 This mirrors the rhetoric and official acts of U.S. Attorney
General Jeff Sessions. 40 For anyone who cares about the actual policy,
these efforts are easily critiqued as being empty rhetoric with heavy
racial overtones. Sometimes, if one looks for actual concrete policies, it
is not clear if the opponents and proponents even disagree. For
example, Nevada Attorney General and Republican frontrunner for
governor Adam Laxalt has campaigned against sanctuary cities and has
said that he wants police to be able to turn "violent offenders" over to
ICE.41 He has repeatedly linked "dangerous" sanctuary policies 42 to
the State of California (e.g., "the threat California's sanctuary cities
pose to Nevada is VERY real").43 And yet, the California Trust Act and
the San Francisco sanctuary ordinance actually permit cooperation
44
with ICE with regard to violent criminals.
When Republican politicians rail against sanctuary cities, three
things seem to be happening. First, the potency of sanctuary policies is
See Ben Botkin, Roberson Leads Chargefor Amendment Banning Sanctuary Cities,
REV.-J. (May 6, 2017, 11:53 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/
news/2017-legislature/roberson-leads-charge-for-amendment-banning-sanctuarycities/.
40 Yvonne Gonzalez, Sessions Coming to Las Vegas to Discuss Sanctuary Cities,
Crime, LAS VEGAS SUN (July 7, 2017, 2:57 PM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/
2017/jul/07/sessions-coming-to-las-vegas-to-discuss-sanctuary/.
41 Press Release, Office of Nev. Att'y Gen. Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General
Laxalt Files Friend of the Court Brief to Protect Nevada by Supporting Prohibition on
Sanctuary City Policies (June 16, 2017), http://ag.nv.gov/News/PR/2017/Attorney
General LaxaltFilesFriend of theCourtBrief to ProtectNevada bySupporting
_Prohibition on SanctuaryCityPolicies/.
42 Adam Paul Laxalt (@AdamLaxalt), TWITTER (Dec. 27, 2017, 9:48 AM),
https://twitter.com/AdamLaxalt/status/946075419522019328.
43 Adam Paul Laxalt (@AdamLaxalt), TWITTER (Jan. 3, 2018, 5:36 PM),
https://twitter.comAdamLaxalt/status/948729694412836864.
44 See Jazmine Ulloa, California Lawmakers Approve Landmark 'SanctuaryState' Bill
to Expand Protections for Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2017, 1:55 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-california-sanctuary-state-bill-20170916story.html ("[A]mendments to the bill made this week would allow federal
immigration authorities to keep working' with state corrections officials and to
continue entering county jails to question immigrants. The legislation would also
permit police and sheriffs to share information and transfer people to immigration
authorities if they have been convicted of one or more crimes from a list of 800
outlined in a previous law .... ").
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puffed up, so that it appears that dangerous immigrants will be given
some form of immunity from federal law enforcement. The supposed
sanctuary that leading Republicans oppose bears quite a bit of
resemblance to medieval church sanctuary, and perhaps also to the
desires of proponents of sanctuary who actually want cities and
campuses to actively protect people from ICE. It has much less
connection to the actual ordinances and statutes that city councils,
mayors, and state legislatures have enacted. Second, there is a racist
dog whistle. From Donald Trump to Jeff Sessions, there has been a
concerted effort to connect immigrants 45 with crime - Mexican
rapists, Salvadoran gang members, and so on. This is a direct appeal to
xenophobia. Third, railing against sanctuary cities is a way of seeming
to defend rule of law, and to portray the other side as proponents of
lawlessness and chaos. It is this last strategic effect that should most
concern defenders of immigrants.
III.

SANCTUARY V. RULE OF LAW

The trouble with the sanctuary terminology is the word begs a
question - sanctuary from what? The most obvious answer is federal
immigration law enforcement. Moreover, the word suggests actual
protection - seeking sanctuary in a church, for example. It implies a
power that states, localities, and colleges do not have. This sense of
power is appealing to people who are quite reasonably appalled by the
prospect of aggressive immigration enforcement. People want to do
something. The call for sanctuary suggests something powerful that can
be done. That is appealing. Yet by appearing to offer protection from
law, any policy that can be labeled "sanctuary," fairly or not, appears
to be for that very reason a challenge to rule of law, and also to the
idea that immigration should be orderly and controlled. This pushes
persuadable voters away, and makes their alliance with white
nationalists more likely. That is a mistake.
To the degree that actual policies matter in this rhetoric, many socalled sanctuary policies are actually about how police should treat
immigrants when they are arrested (ICE detainers and so on). These
are important questions, but it is not the primary terrain on which
immigrant advocates should want to be fighting. It favors the Trump
administration's rhetoric aiming to portray immigrants as criminals,
45 See, e.g., Alan Gomez, Trump Painted a Dark Picture of Immigrants, Despite the
Facts, USA TODAY (Jan. 31, 2018, 5:37 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/2018/01/31/trump-painted-dark-picture-immigrants-despite-facts/
1081208001/.
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even though the data shows the contrary. While there are important
policy questions concerning treatment of immigrant criminal suspects,
immigrants who have committed a crime have much less public
support. For immigrant rights advocates, being drawn into a debate
about immigrants who have been arrested appears to be a mistake.
Polling data illustrates the point. Early in 2017, a Harvard-Harris
poll found that even though seventy-seven percent of Americans
supported comprehensive immigration reform, eighty percent said
local authorities should cooperate with federal immigration agents. 46
However, this eighty percent result came in response to a very specific
question: "Should cities that arrest illegal immigrants for crimes be
required to turn them over to immigration authorities?" 47 This
question did not use the word sanctuary, but it focused the listener's
attention on people who are arrested for "crime," and underlines these
ideas with the word "illegal." 48 As Politifact noted, another opinion
poll conducted around the same time found that nineteen percent
favored deporting all unauthorized immigrants, while fifty-three
percent favored deportations only for people guilty of "serious
49
crimes."
The problem for pro-immigrant policies may not just be the fixation
on crime. In 2015, a poll of Californians asked, "Do you believe that
local authorities should be able to ignore a federal request to hold an
illegal immigrant who has been detained?" In response, 73.5 percent
said, "No."50 The active words here are "federal request," "illegal
immigrant," and "ignore" - as in ignore a federal request to hold
someone who is illegal. This data suggests that opponents of
immigration are smart to focus voters' attention on the vocabulary of
legality. Sanctuary rhetoric helps them to do this, and positions proimmigrant policies on the wrong side of this debate. It makes it seem
that local governments are being asked to defy federal law, even
46 Jonathan Easley, Poll: Americans Overwhelmingly Oppose Sanctuary Cities, HILL
(Feb. 21, 2017, 2:19 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administrationL/320487-pollamericans-overwhelmingly-oppose-sanctuary-cities.
47 Louis Jacobson, Anatomy of a Statistic: Do 80 Percent of Americans Oppose

Sanctuary Cities?, POLITIFACT (Feb. 24, 2017, 2:50 PM) (emphasis added),
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2017/feb/24/anatomy-statistic-do-80percent-americans-oppose-s/.
48 Id. ("[T]he question being asked didn't actually use the words 'sanctuary cities.'
The other concerned words that the question did use - 'arrest' and 'crimes."').
49 Id.
50 Kathleen Maclay, IGS Poll: Californians Say Cities Should Not Be Sanctuaries,
INST. GOVERNMENTAL STUD. UC BERKELEY (Sept. 4, 2015), https://igs.berkeley.
edu/news/igs-poll-californians-say-cities-should-not-be-sanctuaries#data.
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though the law entitles localities and states to considerable autonomy
on enforcement policy.

IV.

BEYOND THE WORD

So, what can be done?
This essay is largely a lament, because we may be stuck with the
unfortunate label of "sanctuary cities." Even when politicians know
not to use the sanctuary label, the media uses it anyway. Consider, for
example, coverage of Governor Jerry Brown's signing of SB 54, the
California Values Act, in 2017. He did not use the term sanctuary
5
state. The Los Angeles Times did, and so did many others. ' Rhetorical
problems like this are common in immigration. This is not like the
fight over "undocumented" versus "illegal." In that case, immigrant
advocates oppose the vocabulary of their opponents. In the case of
"sanctuary" policies, the right, left, and reputable media are all using
the same language, but the right knows that it is in their interest.
But all is not lost. Despite the problematic terminology, some
polling indicates that majorities will support sanctuary policies if they
are framed in a certain way. An online poll of Floridians tested this,
using the "sanctuary city" label explicitly. 52 But rather than focus on
people who have been arrested, or on ignoring federal requests, this
poll framed questions around how localities should respond to
pressure from the Trump Administration. The answers were
overwhelming. One question asked, "Should the federal government
cut off funds to cities that provide sanctuary for illegal immigrants?"
53
The majority said "no," by a fifty-two to thirty-six percent margin.
Another asked, "Do you agree or disagree with Tampa becoming a
Sanctuary City?" The answer was supportive of Tampa being a
sanctuary, by a sixty-one to thirty-nine percent margin. 54 The poll
defined "sanctuary city" as a place that "offers safe harbor for

See, e.g., Taryn Luna, California to Become a 'Sanctuary State' in 2018,
(Oct. 5, 2017, 11:01 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politicsgovernment/capitol-alert/articlel77212866.html; Jazmine Ulloa, California Becomes
'Sanctuary State' in Rebuke of Trump Immigration Policy, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-brown-california-sanctuary-state-bill2017 1005 -story.html.
52 College of Business, Florida Favors Sanctuary Cities, Sen. Nelson Vulnerable in
51
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53 Id.
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undocumented immigrants." 55 Not that these questions focused on the
practical impact ("might otherwise be deported"), and did not imply
defiance to federal laws. Instead, it focused on the federal
government's efforts to pressure localities ("cut off funds").
The key is for immigrant advocates to be aware of the downside of
the sanctuary label, even when the label cannot be avoided. The label
is not an insurmountable obstacle, but it is a challenge which makes
careful framing of issues all the more important. Most important, any
strategy that hopes to win over the largest number of allies for
immigrants in an electoral contest must be aware that some voters are
confused about why illegal immigration happens, and do not
inherently think that strict enforcement of the law is a bad thing. Such
voters are potential allies for immigrants, but they are also potential
allies for their opponents.

55 Id.

